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Dear friends! 
We are proud to present the first issue of the BISS 
International Monitoring – an analytical report 
assessing the key trends in international relations 
engaging Belarus. This issue analyzes four Belarus’ 
foreign political vectors: its relations with the 
European Union, with Russia, with China and with 
“Third World” countries. The objective of the 
International Monitoring is to not only record and 
categorize changes in Belarus’ external political 
efforts and the country’s standing on the 
international scene, but also provide a forecast for 
future developments in the key foreign policy areas.
Belarus’ accession to a customs union with Russia 
and Kazakhstan and the presidential election late in 
2010 dramatically affected Belarus’ international 
standing. One might say that official Minsk got back 
to its “single-vector” foreign policy and isolation from the West after the 
December 19 events. The matter does not seem unambiguous, though, as 
various interests clash and fight both inside Belarus and beyond it, capable of 
markedly adjusting the country’s foreign political vectors and changing the 
situation, if not to the opposite, then at least to something substantially different 
from what is observed now. The primary objective of this issue of the 
International Monitoring, encompassing the period from January 1 through March 
31, 2011, is to figure out where exactly Belarus stands in the framework of 
international politics, and what modifications can be expected in a few months to 
come.
We expect that the International Monitoring will be issued once in two months, 
increasingly covering a broader range of Belarus’ foreign political relations. We 
hope you will share your views and suggestions with us to make the Monitoring 
better and more interesting.
Dzianis Melyantsou
Editor
Yauheni Preiherman, Georgy Plaschinsky, Andrei Skriba, Siarhei 
Bohdan.
Authors: 
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The project is supported by 
The Slovak Agency for 
International Development
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Russia: +20 (+42/-22)EU: -15 (+4/-19)
China : +3 (+3/0)
Third World: +6 (+6/0)
Indices of Belarus’ foreign policy 
vectors 
In this picture you can see the today’s Belarusian Foreign Windrose, which has quite an exotic 
appearance. Since the EU’s index, according to the experts’ calculations, has a negative value (-15), 
the western foreign policy vector has changed its direction to the opposite and strengthened the 
eastern one. 
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Development of EU-Belarus 
relations
Description of the initial state of relations
Description of the key events in the period
The relations between Belarus and the European Union prior to the period covered by this 
Monitoring issue were developing mostly in the context of the presidential campaign. The positive 
trend that emerged before the race for presidency grew more prominent in the fourth quarter of 
2010 owing to evident liberalization of socio-political activity during the collection of signatures to 
support presidential nominees and canvassing. 
During that period, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite, foreign ministers of some European 
countries, European Commissioners for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy and for 
Health and Consumer Policy paid visits to Minsk. The European Commission continued developing 
(albeit not transparently) the Joint Interim Plan, which was supposed to become a transition 
systemic framework for a more intensive cooperation (since the EU did not ratify a standard 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus). In order to encourage  further internal 
political liberalization, Belarus was promised EUR 3 billion during the visit of foreign ministers of 
Poland and Germany on condition the country’s presidential election met international democratic 
standards. Belarus and the EU continued discussing and developing cross-border cooperation 
projects. One indication of that positive trend was the expanding cooperation between Belarus and 
European financial institutions. The only dark spot in the picture was the continuing problem of 
Belarus’ representation in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, the parliamentary component of 
the Eastern Partnership.
However, that super-positive trend in Belarusian-EU relations ended quite suddenly as a result of 
the brutal dispersal of a rally in Minsk on December 19, 2010 and a wave of politically-motivated 
repressions that followed. The European Union did not recognize the official results of the 
presidential election in Belarus and condemned the actions of the Belarusian authorities after the 
election day.
The monitored period of Belarusian-EU relations was marked by the EU’s efforts to look for the best 
scenario of response to the events in Belarus. Following a few immediate statements by EU officials 
(including the joint statement by Catherine Ashton and Hillary Clinton on January 5) to reprove the 
Belarusian authorities, the European Parliament launched a thorough probe into the situation. On 
January 12, the European Parliament held an extraordinary Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee 
meeting on the situation in Belarus. In a joint statement issued after the session, MEPs outlined a 
policy to take sanctions against official Minsk.
In an attempt to avert or at least mitigate the potential sanctions, Belarusian Foreign Minister 
Siarhei Martynau went on a “diplomatic exoneration tour” around a few European capital cities in 
January. He sought to have his European counterparts hear out the official version of what 
happened in Belarus. It is noteworthy that, according to some reports, Martynau played the 
“geopolitical card”, as he was reportedly speaking about the “Russian hand” in the December 19 
events and a growing vulnerability to the pressures coming from Russia. EU officials were 
uncompromising, though.
Summary index: -15
Total positive points: 4 
Total negative points: -19
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On January 20, the European Parliament passed a resolution on Belarus. The final version of the 
document appeared to be milder than the original draft prepared by the European Parliament 
factions. Nevertheless, the document called for (very smoothly, though) rather strong measures 
against the Lukashenka regime: to consider targeted economic sanctions and suspension of 
macrofinancial assistance; reinstate and expand visa sanctions; freeze personal assets of the 
persons subject to sanctions; and consider suspension of Minsk’s membership in the Eastern 
Partnership initiative. MEPs also argued that large international sporting events, such as the 2014 
IIHF World Championship, must not be held in Belarus as long as the country had political 
prisoners.
On January 31, the Council of the European Union adopted a final resolution on Belarus. The 
document proved to be even less rigid than the final resolution of the European Parliament of 
January 20. The document imposed visa bans and asset freeze against 158 persons responsible for 
political repressions in Belarus. The Council resolved to increase its support for Belarusian civil 
society and restated the importance of visa facilitation and reduction in Schengen visa costs for 
Belarusians. The Council also emphasized its commitment to the policy of “critical engagement” 
with Belarus. Building on the decision of the Council of the European Union, Warsaw hosted the 
international donors’ conference “Solidarity with Belarus” on February 2. The conference gathered 
officials and NGO representatives from the EU, United States, Canada and the Eastern Partnership 
bloc (except Belarus). The conference pledged allocation of EUR 87 million to Belarusian civil 
society for promotion of democracy and support for political prisoners. About 75% of the total will 
be provided by EU member-states and institutions (for instance, the European Commission 
quadrupled the volume of support for Belarus for 2011-2013 to EUR 15.6 million from EUR 4 
million.
In response to the actions of the Belarusian authorities and keeping to the general track toward a 
harsher policy of the Union, the heads of the European Parliament political factions on February 10 
adopted a decision to lift the freeze off the Euronest issue and call its first session without inviting 
Belarus. In contrast to that initiative (but in line with the resolution dated January 31), the Council 
of the European Union on February 28 issued a mandate for the European Commission to start 
negotiations over a simplification of visa relations with Belarus.
Further developments in Belarus showed that the authorities had opted for the confrontational 
track (searches, arrests and interrogations continued; courts passed severe sentences; information 
was divulged about tortures in prisons) and prompted the EU to take additional steps. On March 
10, the EU adopted a resolution calling for stricter measures against those involved in violation of 
human rights in Belarus. Eleven days later, on March 21, the Council of the European Union applied 
the visa ban to more Belarusian officials. On the same day, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry said it 
would reciprocate and slapped a visa ban on EU and US representatives (the list was not disclosed) 
and tightened control over illegal foreign financing of political activities in Belarus.
1) A sharp deterioration in relations and explosive escalation of the conflict. This 
tendency results from shocks at the post-election developments both in Minsk and in Brussels and 
is manifested is numerous negative statements, resolutions and mutual sanctions. The EU was 
shocked not so much at the brutality of the Belarusian authorities, as at the fact that Minsk chose 
such a way to withdraw from the engagement process. Many in the EU interpreted the situation 
as Lukashenka’s betrayal. It appears that the Belarusian political establishment gives the same 
interpretation to the policy pursued by the EU. The trend precisely corresponds to the logic of the 
conflict as a whole and the psychological profile of one of its parties – Aliaxander Lukashenka.
2) Increase in general uncertainty about the future of relations. The previous paradigm of 
the EU policy on Belarus – the strategy of “socialization and engagement” – clearly failed, given 
the current situation. However, the EU has no strategic alternative. Belarus has no clear strategic 
vision, either, hence fuzzy expressions in documents and statements, resulting from the complexity 
of efforts to align actors’ interests, which are frequently contradictory.
3) (in the context of the second trend) “Freezing” of previous plans and active search for 
new (or modified old) cooperation patterns. Many of the elaborated cross-border cooperation 
projects were as good as “frozen”, and so were the achievements in the framework of the Eastern 
Partnership and in the area of cooperation with European financial institutions. The Joint Interim 
Plan was postponed indefinitely. At the same time, all projects and accumulated experience did not 
fall into oblivion, but were put off until the situation cleared up – one proof of this is the absence 
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of any truly harsh measures by the EU, which would rule out any chance of getting back to 
dialogue as early as this year. Moreover, there is a single condition that Belarus needs to meet for 
the EU to start the de-freezing procedure – it has to release and rehabilitate all political prisoners 
(which offers the Belarusian authorities room for bargaining).
One may consider the decision of the EU to give up the peg of the visa issue to the progress in 
talks with the Belarusian government to be the first step towards new cooperation tactics. This 
means the double-track approach to Belarus is growing stronger; however, there are no reasons to 
believe that a new strategy is being mapped out.
In a few months to come, the conflict between Belarus and the EU will unlikely lose its bitterness. 
We cannot rule out further escalation resulting from targeted economic sanctions imposed by the 
Union in response to new sentences in Belarus. At the same time, both Belarus and the EU are 
interested in getting back to the negotiating table. Since the Belarusian authorities cannot afford 
themselves to pass lenient sentences on the key figures of the “mass riots” case (because an 
essential objective of judicial trials is to raise the fear level in society), there is no point for them to 
make public moves towards the EU for the time being. The positive impact of such decisions (for 
instance, the abolition of capital punishment and phase-by-phase release of political prisoners, etc.) 
will be neutralized by court rulings all the same. The Belarusian authorities will have to make up 
their mind fast, though, as the next electoral cycle is near, requiring a reduction in external 
confrontation, while Russian pressure keeps growing stronger amid the rapidly deteriorating 
economic situation. Therefore, one might expect the authorities to start looking for ways (if they 
are not looking for them already) to tackle the conflict and eventually end it through diplomatic 
channels, including informal, like it happened in 2006-2007.
Forecast for the near term 
642
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Development of Belarus-Russia 
relations
Description of the initial state of relations
Description of the key events in the period
The relations between Belarus and Russia are developing fast, the dominating trend towards 
cooperation and deepening of relations being set by the package of agreements on the 
establishment of the Common Economic Area of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, inked in Moscow 
on December 9, 2010. Belarus is involved in further development of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC) and the Customs Union, keeping up its efforts to work out common positions 
and shape institutions of interaction with its partners. The administrations of Belarus and Russia 
eagerly employ the integration rhetoric again, mentioning the prospects of the single currency and 
creation of joint ventures.
Nevertheless, amid progressing economic integration, the two countries frequently lack 
understanding politically. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev strives for a foreign policy that is 
based on democratic values, respect for human rights and principle of extraterritorial protection of 
interests of Russian citizens. Russia will not any longer turn a blind eye to such events as the brutal 
dispersal of a peaceful opposition rally in Minsk on December 19, 2010, as a result of which 
Russian citizens were arrested. At the same time, the Belarusian authorities, while trying to prevent 
an increase in Russia’s influence in this country, appear to be short of room for maneuver to carry 
out a balanced external policy after the sharp deterioration in their relations with the West.
Therefore, being unable to conduct a truly multi-vector policy and facing a deficit of legitimacy, 
Aliaxander Lukashenka is forced to prioritize cooperation with Russia and take part in integration 
projects beneficial to Russian ruling elites.
Of all important events in Belarusian-Russian relations in the period from January 1 through March 
31 the problems with oil supplies in early 2011 clearly stand out. They emerged as a result of 
Russia’s attempt to increase profits of its energy suppliers and cut the rent of the Belarusian 
government. Belarus received the first batch of Russian crude as late as January 25, after Prime 
Ministers of Belarus and Russia Mikhail Miasnikovich and Vladimir Putin tackled all disputable 
issues.
The “case of Artyom Breus and Ivan Gaponov” was arguably the most negative event marring the 
bilateral relations. Those two Russian citizens were first sentenced to administrative arrest for 
taking part in an unsanctioned opposition rally on December 19, 2010, and then accused of staging 
mass riots, punishable by a prison sentence of up to 15 years. However, the efforts of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry and Russian Embassy in Belarus were a success, when both Breus and Gaponov 
were sentenced to major fines of around USD 3,500 each.
A real breakthrough was achieved on March 15, when Minsk hosted a session of the Union State 
Council of Ministers, which adopted an agreement on cooperation in the construction of the 
Belarusian nuclear power plant and addressed the possibility of a targeted USD 9 billion 25-year 
loan for the construction of the plant. The agreement was signed in package with the additional 
intergovernmental deal on ensuring the parallel operation of the united energy system of Russia 
and united power grid of Belarus. The latter envisages the creation of a joint Belarusian-Russian 
Summary index: +20
 
Total positive points: +42
Total negative points: -22
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venture to sell electricity between OAO Inter RAO UES and Belenergo on a parity basis by July 1, 
2011.
Another crucial event of the first quarter was Belarus’ request for a USD 2 billion loan from the 
EurAsEC Bailout Fund. Amid the unfolding foreign exchange crisis, the Belarusian government 
resorted to borrowing with a view to stabilizing the situation on the domestic money market.
The events described above suggest that tensions still remain in Belarusian-Russian relations at the 
political level, even though the Belarusian government announced a sort of a “reset” (the total of 
negative points used to calculate the index proves this). The Belarusian administration definitely 
favors cooperation with Russia and is ready to meet halfway and offer concessions in order to 
achieve its foreign political goals in the eastern direction.
It is noteworthy that the need to respect human rights and protect interests of Russian citizens 
became a serious factor for Russian external policymakers on Belarus. Russia also strives for setting 
out clear commitments that Belarus must meet in its cooperation efforts and to some extent 
employs the “conditionality” principle, which is evident from the terms that Russia believes the 
Belarusian authorities must meet to get the intergovernmental and stabilization loans. Bilateral 
cooperation at the level of ministries and agencies has been developing quite actively, and so has 
multilateral cooperation within the EurAsEC, the Customs Union and the CIS. 
Based on the logic of the evolution of bilateral relations and given the lack of any decent foreign 
political alternatives, Belarus will continue its cooperation with Russia in the short run, being 
dependent on its support both in its internal affairs and internationally. In its turn, Russia will keep 
insisting, within due limits, on Belarus’ observing human rights and reforming its economic system.
The two countries will further cooperate in the military sphere and in the construction of Belarus’ 
first nuclear power plant in Astravets and announce new initiatives to set up joint ventures, attract 
foreign investments and privatize state-run enterprises. 
Belarus will keep its active engagement in integration processes in the former Soviet Union. It will 
build integration institutes together with Kazakhstan and agree foreign trade tariffs within the 
Customs Union. The most expected event in Belarusian-Russian relations is the commitment of 
stabilization loans to Belarus, enabling this country to improve its internal economic situation. 
Main trends
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Development of Belarus-China 
relations
Total positive points: +3
Summary index: +3
Total negative points: 0
Description of the initial state of relations
Description of the key events in the period
The economic cooperation between the two countries contributes the most to the very high level of 
Belarusian-Chinese political relations by promoting trade relations and facilitating Chinese 
investments in Belarus. This is corroborated by the substantial increase in mutual trade turnover: 
mutual trade amounted to USD 2.2 billion in 2008, hit by the global crisis, which compares to only 
USD 34 million in 1990. In the first six months of 2010, Belarusian-Chinese trade turnover reached 
USD 1.068 billion, which represents a 60% increase year-on-year.
The two countries establish joint ventures in both Belarus and China, and the Belarusian authorities 
facilitate Chinese construction and investment projects in Belarus. 
Economic cooperation expanded into the banking sector in March 2009, when the People’s Bank of 
China and the National Bank of Belarus (NBB) agreed a three-year currency swap worth 20 billion 
yuan, or 8 trillion Belarusian rubles (Br), or USD 2.78 billion (as of the time of the deal). Belarus 
and China thus switched to settlements in the national currencies in bilateral trade.
Chinese loans are just as important for the Belarusian economy. The recession-hit economy 
benefited considerably from Chinese tied loans (despite the lending terms) during 2009 and 2010, 
when it was crucial for the country to restructure its economy while preserving the modernization 
pace, and when Belarusian-Russian relations went through an acute phase prior to the presidential 
campaign.
The start of the year 2011 was not marked by hyperactivity in Belarusian-Chinese relations. The 
Chinese loans taken on the eve of the presidential election in late 2010 provided certain support for 
the Belarusian economy, facilitating the creation of new productions and modernization of existing 
manufacturers, and further attracting Chinese investments in the country. Furthermore, China’s 
political support at the top level and recognition of the presidential election results by the Chinese 
administration indicated that the two countries shared views and were ready to continue developing 
bilateral relations.
At the same time, in January-March, Belarusian-Chinese relations were reduced to exclusively 
economic contacts at the level of separate enterprises. Joint ventures kept working and buying 
equipment and components for modernization; Chinese makers were involved in housing 
construction in Belarus and creation of new productions. When it comes to prospects of furthering 
joint projects, they are discussed at the level of companies’ executives. The absence of Belarusian 
high- and top-ranking officials during negotiations with China may be attributed both to internal 
problems of the Belarusian economy and some easing of tensions in Belarusian-Russian relations. 
Apparently, as soon as Belarus and Russia agreed that the construction of Belarus’ first nuclear 
power plant would be financed from a Russian state loan, and new talks started over new loans, 
some of the economic cooperation initiatives of Belarusian and Chinese partners were postponed, 
and the intensity of negotiations with the Chinese side decreased. Nevertheless, negotiations are 
still underway, which was confirmed by a counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Belarus, who said 
Belarus and China mulled around 20 new projects worth more than USD 5 billion.
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Forecast for the near term
There are two marked trends in Belarusian-Chinese relations now. The first one is the permanent 
proximity of political positions in the international scene on a very broad range of issues, refusal to 
criticize the state leaders and political systems, and mutual support at international events, 
conferences, etc. This trend will remain for as long as possible, because the Belarusian 
administration finds it essential to have political support of one of the leading nations globally, the 
economic leader of Southeast Asia and one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. 
This kind of support is especially crucial now that Belarus’ relations with Russia are not that 
unambiguous. 
The second trend is characterized by the economic relations between the two nations. Amid the 
global economic crisis, lower foreign trade volumes and the considerable commodity trade deficit 
(imports exceed exports), as well as the need for restructuring and modernization of the economy, 
Belarus requires investments and cheap loans extended without political conditionality very badly. It 
is clear that the economic cooperation between Belarus and China will develop at a moderate pace, 
trade turnover will keep growing, and so will loans to the Belarusian economy and Chinese 
investments in Belarus. 
The alleviation of tensions in Belarusian-Russian relations logically affected the intensity of 
negotiations with Chinese partners. The tendency towards a moderate increase in trade turnover 
and moderate development of economic relations will evidently remain in the next few months, until 
Belarus clarifies the situation with the terms of financing of its nuclear project and likelihood of 
Russian loans.  At the same time, if recession continues in the Belarusian economy and additional 
financing is required, new currency loans might become a serious burden on the Belarusian state 
budget in a few years to come. This is why the country may want to resume talks with Chinese 
investors over a sale of a minority shareholding in Belaruskali; however, this will be a last resort 
measure for the Belarusian administration. There are no prerequisites for stepping up political 
dialogue in the next couple of months; top-level meetings are possible only as part of routine 
procedures to address current issues.
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Development of Belarus’ relations 
with the Third World 
Total positive points: +6
Summary index: +6
Total negative points: 0
Description of the initial state of relations
Description of the key events in the period
Belarus’ efforts to cooperate with developing countries are insufficiently diversified and focus 
mainly on China, Venezuela, Vietnam, Iran, and Syria. Belarus also has stable (but not as deep) 
relations with Oman, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Cuba and South Africa.
The key endeavor of the Belarusian side in its foreign political vector targeting the Third World is to 
search for new market outlets and any other economic instruments to compensate for its foreign 
trade deficit. In many cases, Belarus has reached impressive progress (Iran), however, with some 
(China) Belarus’ trade deficit is painfully large. The Belarusian government refrains from 
engagement in adventurous political projects, therefore, despite its resounding rhetoric, it does not 
pursue truly large-scale projects in the countries subject to international sanctions or openly 
confronting the West, and holds back from supplying them with hazardous military technologies 
and equipment. 
Burma. On January 13-14, 2011, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Myanmar U Maung Myint 
paid a visit to Belarus. Contacts with Myanmar are sporadic – in July 2000, Burmese Foreign 
Minister U Win Aung visited Belarus, and in June 2010, a Belarusian delegation of businesses led by 
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Aleinik paid a visit to Myanmar.
Iran. The Iranian Ambassador to Belarus said during a press availability timed to the anniversary 
of the Iranian Revolution that his country carried out projects totaling USD 1.5 billion in Belarus, 
and over USD 1 billion worth of joint Belarusian-Iranian projects were negotiated. He cited the 
examples of Magnit-Minsk multifunctional complex to be built by Iranian Kayson for approximately 
EUR 250 million, as well as the construction of Prilesye transport and logistical center in the free 
economic zone Minsk. Iranian investment projects are actively advertized in Belarus when partners 
declare their intent, however, as a rule, projects never even reach the phase of architectural 
design, and therefore, caution must be exercised when analyzing any statements of Iranian 
representatives. Interestingly, the diplomat mentioned the Minsk District-based Samand passenger 
car assembly, despite the fact that back on February 15, 2011, Belarus’ First Deputy Prime Minister 
Uladzimir Siamashka told members of the lower chamber of parliament, the House of 
Representatives, that the Belarusian government was ready to give up the assembly of Iranian cars 
and considered making a Chinese car instead.
The situation with the Belarusian project to produce oil in Iran remains vague and is unlikely to 
clarify in the short run. There are obstacles to the joint oil project in both Belarus and Iran, and its 
prospects are quite gloomy.
Cuba. An official delegation of Cuba led by Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla visited 
Belarus on February 21-23, 2011. Lukashenka met with the minister and said that Cuba was “one 
of our principal partners in Central and Latin America”.
The peak of economic cooperation with Cuba was attained in 2008, when mutual trade turnover 
reached USD 49.7 million (Belarusian exports exceeded USD 35 million, and imports from Cuba 
were at USD 14.6 million). In 2010, trade turnover shrank to mere USD 7.4 million, including USD 
6.9 million worth of exports from Belarus (mostly car parts, trucks, tractors and tires).
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Gambia. Africa is still an undiscovered continent for Belarus. Gambian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
International Cooperation and Gambians Abroad Mamadou Tangara visited Belarus on February 28-
March 2, 2011 (his first visit to Belarus was in August 2010). Belarusian Foreign Minister Siarhei 
Martynau said: “Quite shortly, the Gambian Minister of Economy and Finance is due to visit us with 
his delegation. During that visit, we hope to advance on the path of our concrete co-operation on a 
number of economic agreements and those commercial proposals submitted to Gambia previously.” 
Given the modest social and economic parameters of that African country, the proposals will hardly 
result in a breakthrough.
Iran. Belarusian Justice Minister Viktar Halavanav paid a visit to Iran on March 2-4, 2011. The 
minister not only held traditional negotiations with his Iranian counterpart Morteza Bakhtiari, but 
also was accepted at a quite high level by head of the judicial system of Iran Sadeq Larijani and 
Iranian Parliament (Majlis) Speaker Ali Larijani. The two countries signed an extradition treaty 
during Halavanau’s visit, but the practice of ratification of Belarusian-Iranian agreements shows that 
the signing of the deal does not mean it will come into effect any time soon.
Morocco. Building on Belarus’ general effort to diversify its foreign relations, a Belarusian 
delegation visited Morocco on March 3-4. Leading the delegation was Deputy Foreign Minister of 
Belarus Siarhei Aleinik. The delegation included representatives of MAZ truck producer and MTZ 
tractor maker. The meetings were held at a relatively low level, which indicates the same old 
problem that the Foreign Ministry has run into many times now: foreign visits are inefficient and call 
for professional expert engagement and serious preliminary planning. 
Vietnam. In mid-February 2011, a delegation of the Belarusian Defense Ministry led by Aide to 
Defense Minister with respect to ideological work in the Armed Forces, head of the central 
department for ideological work of the Defense Ministry Major General Aliaxander Gura paid a visit 
to Vietnam The delegation was received at a very high level, as Gura met with Minister of National 
Defense Phùng Quang Thanh and head of the Central political department of Vietnam People’s Army 
Ngô Xuân L?ch. Just like Cuba, Vietnam has been Belarus’ traditional partner since the Soviet times, 
and cooperation with Vietnam remains quite stable. However, Belarusian-Vietnamese trade 
amounted to USD 145.9 million in 2010, with a substantial surplus for Belarus, which a major 
difference from Belarus’ relations with Cuba, with very modest economic foundation as of today.
Venezuela. In late March 2011, some media, primarily Ukrainian UNIAN news service, reported 
that Belarus had given up imports of Venezuelan oil. The report was based on Belarus’ failure to 
take Azeri oil from the Odesa-Brody pipeline, which is supplied to Belarus under an oil swap deal 
with Venezuela. It is not quite clear why Belarus needed Azeri oil when it received, and is receiving, 
Venezuelan crude oil (tankers were on their way to Baltic seaports with oil for Belarus in mid-March 
2011). Belarus’ First Deputy Prime Minister Uladzimir Siamashka denied the reports that Belarus had 
given up on imports from Venezuela, although UNIAN claimed with reference to an unnamed source 
that Belarus had decided not to take Venezuelan oil any more because of more favorable deliveries 
from Russia. Anyway, the idea of the Belarusian government to use alternative oil sources as a 
bargaining chip during its oil talks will likely remain. Furthermore, in Venezuela, unlike Iran, Belarus 
quite successfully carries out projects to produce oil and modernize the local economy with 
generous support of the authorities.
Arab revolutions. On January 27, the Foreign Ministry’s spokesman said: “The Foreign Ministry of 
Belarus is concerned over developments in Egypt related to mass protests spanning the largest 
cities of the country. We are convinced that street clashes and violence are a bad way to handle 
immediate social and public problems. We urge the parties to address existing issues solely by 
peaceful means at the negotiating table and in compliance with international legal standards.”
Belarus’ official statements on Libya became a more vivid reflection of the internal political situation 
in this country. Whereas at first Belarus issued a statement supporting the UN Security Council 
resolution on Libya, after just two days the Belarusian Foreign Ministry de facto supported Gaddafi: 
“The Republic of Belarus calls on the states involved in the military operation to cease, with 
immediate effect, the military operations which lead to human casualties. The settlement of the 
conflict is an internal affair of Libya and should be carried out by the Libyan people alone without 
military intervention from outside.” The statement indicates a rather risky foreign political line in 
conditions when such a strong support for Gaddafi  became a continuation of the confrontation with 
the West over non-Belarus issues. Anyway, the statement itself is hardly based on a thorough 
analysis of the international situation, that is, the Foreign Ministry in effect chose to confront the 
West, and even if this course is encouraged by Gaddafi’s material remuneration rather than 
ideological considerations, this policy cannot be considered a well-judged move of Belarusian 
diplomacy.
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Search for new partners (contacts with Myanmar, Gambia, Morocco), having little success despite its 
intensity and duration. This trend is well identified by visits of Belarusian delegations led, as a rule, 
by Deputy Foreign Minister Siarhei Aleinik, to countries deemed as potential trade partners.
The geography of foreign relations remains habitual, except for a couple of less active contacts with 
Venezuela and the possible refusal of official Minsk to accept oil deliveries from that country. 
Belarus’ cooperation with Venezuela could have been affected by the pressure coming from Russia, 
which is naturally interested in remaining the oil and gas monopoly in Europe. Belarus, with its need 
for economic modernization, is incapable of attracting sufficient investments from the Third World, 
and even the scarce investment inflows hardly promote Belarus’ modernization, as investments are 
mostly channeled into low-tech environmentally-unfriendly productions, mainly in the mining sector 
(granite), construction materials industry (low-tech cement production) and assembly factories 
(passenger cars).
Belarus might wish to revise its general foreign strategy towards more risky options. This theory is 
supported by the suspicious events in Côte d’Ivoire, possible contacts with Gaddafi and the 
pronounced anti-Western stance of the Foreign Ministry in its attempt to support Gaddafi. This 
foreign policy revision will likely take place not at the level of the Foreign Ministry, but even beyond 
it.
By adopting an anti-Western position the Belarusian authorities must have crossed the line, and the 
West will not turn a blind eye to many of Belarus’ policies pertaining to developing nations, like it 
happened previously.
The Belarusian administration would like and will try to deepen its cooperation with the Third World 
to compensate for the vacuum in relations with the West, however, all the easy options have been 
used up, and it is next to impossible for Belarusian trade and industry, with their low level of 
expertise and inefficient state management structure to “discover” new countries and markets.
The most successful projects will most likely be carried out with the countries that build their 
relations with Belarus based on the positive track record of cooperation – China, Vietnam, Turkey. 
However, the investments and solutions that Belarus imports in the framework of investment 
projects cannot efficiently address the country’s modernization needs.
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Supplement
Catalogue of the events based on which experts have calculated 
the relations development index 
Date     Event                                                                                                            Point
January 5
January 12
January
January 20
January 31
February 2
February 10
February 28
March 3
March 10
March 21
March 21
January-March
February-March
Total
Joint statement by Catherine Ashton and Hillary Clinton
(gave the problem a transatlantic dimension)
European Parliament’s extraordinary Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee meeting on 
Belarus and final statement
(policy outlined to apply sanctions)
Siarhei Martynau’s “Diplomatic exoneration tour”
(attempt to prevent nullification of the progress Belarus made in 2008-2010 when 
pursuing dialogue with the EU)
European Parliament’s resolution on Belarus
Council of the European Union’s resolution on Belarus
Conference “Solidarity with Belarus” in Warsaw
(official Minsk was not invited to take part)
Decision of the European Parliament political factions to call the first Euronest 
session without inviting Belarus 
Decision of the Council of the European Union to issue a mandate for the European 
Commission to negotiate a simplification of the visa regime with Belarus
Nine countries (non-EU member states) joined the EU in its sanctions against 
Belarus 
(a stronger foreign political impact of the sanctions on Belarus) 
European Parliament’s resolution calling for stricter measures against those involved 
in violation of human rights in Belarus
Decision of the Council of the European Union to extend the list of persons subject 
to sanctions
(further escalation of the conflict)
Statement of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry on retaliatory sanctions against some 
representatives of the EU
Numerous negative (and even insulting) statements of officials representing both 
sides and numerous negative materials in the media
A series of consultations at the level of Foreign Ministries of Belarus and some EU 
member-states (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia)
(a minimum communication channel is preserved officially)
- 1
- 1
1
- 1
- 3
- 2
- 2
2
- 1
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 2
1
- 15
Development of EU-Belarus relations
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January 6-25
 
January 12
 
January 13
 
January 13
 
January 18
 
January 20
 
January 21
 
January 25
 
January 26
 
January 28
 
January 28
 
February 1
 
February 2
 
February 2
 
February 3
Belarus and Russia cannot reach agreement on the price formula for duty-free oil 
deliveries 
Anatoli Rubinau, Speaker of the upper chamber of parliament, the Council of the 
Republic: “Russia is not simply a partner, but a state that is close to us in its spirit 
and language. It is a country that we have been with for centuries and will stay 
together.”
Sergei Lavrov: “No Russian politicians or officials have been invited to the 
inauguration of President Aliaxander Lukashenka.”
Sergei Lavrov: “The resolution of the Council of Europe on Belarus also reflects the 
Russian standpoint.”
The department for information and press with the Russian Foreign Ministry was 
sorry to learn that the Belarusian authorities denied extension of accreditation to 
Kommersant correspondent in Belarus Movsun Gadzhiyev 
Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Miasnikovich’s visit to Moscow and meeting with 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The premiers discussed gas and oil contracts, 
situation with the arrest of Russian nationals, and coming meeting of the Union 
State Council of Ministers
Lukashenka’s inaugural address: “We will continue building the Union State and 
consolidate integration ties in the framework of the Common Economic Area, 
EurAsEC and CIS.”
Negotiations between Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich and Russian 
Rosatom corporation head Sergei Kiriyenko over the agreement on the construction 
of Belarus’ nuclear power plant
The Russian lower chamber of parliament, the State Duma, ratified the 
intergovernmental agreement on mutual supplies of military products, double 
purpose products and civilian industry products during periods of aggression or war
The Russian Embassy in Belarus expressed its surprise and regret at the statement 
of Belarus’ Prosecutor General Ryhor Vasilevich on the situation with Russian 
citizens Artyom Breus and Ivan Gaponov, arrested in Minsk in connection with mass 
disorders on December 19
National Bank of Belarus (NBB) Governor Petr Prokopovich said he supported the 
initiative to change to a single currency within the Common Economic Area
Russian Foreign Ministry: “Unilateral sanctions against Belarus will be 
counterproductive.”
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev: “I am also surprised at the events that have 
taken place in Minsk, and I have ordered that the Foreign Ministry should take note 
of the points that you [human rights activists] mention in your appeal when it 
shapes the diplomatic position of the Russian Federation.”  
Sergei Lavrov: “Mass arrests after the election in Belarus are unacceptable.”
Aliaxander Lukashenka: “I am shocked indeed. You must have forgotten you’re 
working in Belarus, not in Russia. Corruption, carve-up, pressure, deals behind my 
back are not acceptable here.”
- 3
1
-2
- 2
- 1
3
1
2
4
- 1
1
1
- 1
- 1
- 1
Development of Belarusian-Russian 
relations
Date     Event                                                                                                            Point
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February 7 
February 8 
February 9 
February 16 
February 16 
February 16 
February 25 
March 1
March 4 
March 6 
March 12 
March 14 
March 14 
March 14 
- 2
-1
2
1
- 1
- 3
1
2
- 1
1
1
 1
2
3
When on vacation in Sochi, Aliaxander Lukashenka did not meet with 
representatives of Russian businesses or authorities, despite original plans
Sergei Lavrov: “The events that took place after the election were absolutely 
uncalled for and unacceptable. We call for a release of presidential candidates, 
journalists, human rights activists, and two Russian citizens, who have not been 
officially charged yet.”
Minsk hosted consultations of the Belarusian and Russian Foreign Ministries: 
attending were Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and Belarusian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Ihar Petrishenka
Belarus has reached “absolute compromise” with Gazprom in talks over gas 
supplies, Belarus’ First Deputy Prime Minister Uladzimir Siamashka said 
The next session of the lower chamber of parliament will not address Belarus’ 
recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, said Ihar Karpenka, the 
chairman of the commission for international affairs and connections with the CIS of 
the House of Representatives
Uladzimir Siamashka: “Russia defaults on its commitments to deliver oil to Belarus.”
 
Aliaxander Lukashenka: “At the political level, all matters have been resolved [with 
Russia], major agreements have been signed. The economic impact of direct 
cooperation with Russian regions will easily outweigh any trade turnover with 
foreign states.”
Aliaxander Lukashenka adopts an action plan to implement the decisions of the 
December session of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO during his meeting 
with CSTO General Secretary Nikolai Bordyuzha in Minsk
Russian media publish negative comments about the “black lists” of Belarusian 
artists, which also include Russian culture figures
Aliaxander Lukashenka to Washington Post: “We have excellent relations with Putin. 
We have worked together for over a decade, and I advise you against demonizing 
Putin.”
Deputy Economy Minister Anton Kudasau: “The Customs Union is working for the 
benefit of Belarus and its partners. The things that we did not manage to perform 
independently are now possible because of the cooperation with Russia and 
Kazakhstan.”
Aliaxander Lukashenka approves the draft intergovernmental agreement between 
the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the 
construction of the Belarusian nuclear power plant including the principal 
amendments suggested during negotiations with the Russian side
Minsk hosted a session of the Commission of the Customs Union of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia at the level of deputy prime ministers. Deputy Prime Minister 
Siarhei Rumas led the Belarusian delegation, First Deputy Prime Minister Umirzak 
Shukeyev led the Kazakhstan delegation, and First Deputy Prime Minister Igor 
Shuvalov led the Russian delegation. The session adopted the decision to abolish 
transport control on the Belarusian-Russian border on April 1, 2011
Minsk hosted a face-to-face meeting of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and 
Belarusian President Aliaxander Lukashenka
Date     Event                                                                                                            Point
16
January 1 - April 1, 2011
March 15
 
March 15
 
March 15
 
March 17
 
March 18
 
March 22
 
March 22
 
March 24
 
March 30
 
March 30
 
March 31 
Total
3
3
- 1
- 1
1
2
2
1
2
 1
1
20
A session of the Union State Council of Ministers. Belarus and Russia inked the 
document on cooperation in the construction of the Belarusian nuclear power plant; 
the intergovernmental agreement on ensuring the parallel operation of the united 
energy system of Russia and united power grid of Belarus; the intergovernmental 
agreement on cooperation in research and peaceful use of space; interdepartmental 
agreement on the application of the treaty between Belarus and Russia on 
cooperation in social security dated January 24, 2006
The National Library hosted a session of the EurAsEC Interstate Council led by 
Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Miasnikovich, Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Karim 
Masimov and Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin
Overall subsidies to the Belarusian economy will amount to around USD 4.3 billion 
in 2011, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said
“The events connected with the detention of Russian citizen Yurov in Minsk are 
regrettable,” said spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry Aliaxander 
Lukashevich
Lukashenka noted during a meeting with Russian journalists: “The Russian 
government agencies have no intention of making use of the difficulties that 
Belarus is faced with now and pressurizing it.”
Russian State Duma ratified the federal bill “On ratification of the Agreement 
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on creation and 
operation of the joint communications network of the regional force grouping of the 
Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation
Negotiations of the Belarusian governmental delegation with the Russian side over 
credit and financial cooperation in line with previous agreements took place in 
Moscow. The Belarusian delegation was led by Finance Minister Andrei Kharkavets
Belarus’ State Secretary of the Security Council Leanid Maltsau: “It is important to 
consistently develop and consolidate military and military and technical cooperation 
with Russia, and to enhance the efficiency of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO)
Session of the joint board of the Justice Ministries of Belarus and Russia; a program 
of cooperation between the ministries for 2011-2012 is signed
The National Bank of Belarus allows Belarusian importers to make payments in 
Belarusian rubles, Russian rubles and tenge to economic entities of Russia and 
Kazakhstan for acquired imported equipment without limitations
Economy Minister Mikalai Snapkou has no doubts that the Customs Union will be 
beneficial to the Belarusian economy
Date     Event                                                                                                            Point
17
J
February 16
January-March
anuary 27
Total
February 21-23
February 28-March 2 
March 2-4
Total
1
1
1
3
2
2
2
6
Statement of a counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Belarus, who said Belarus and 
China considered around 20 new projects worth over USD 5 billion
First Deputy Prime Minister Uladzimir Siamashka’s speech in the parliament, 
comments on the continuation of Belarusian-Chinese cooperation, allocation of funds 
(USD 676 million) for new productions
Infrequent, but regular and exceptionally positive references to mutually beneficial 
cooperation between Belarus and China in Belarusian mass media 
An official visit of a Cuban delegation led by Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez 
Parrilla
A visit of Gambian Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and 
Gambians Abroad Mamadou Tangara
Belarusian Justice Minister Viktar Halavanau’s visit to Iran
Event ranking scale:
?
5-7 points
? 4 points
3 points
?
2 points
?
1 point
?
minus 1 point
?
minus 2 points
? minus 3 points
minus 3 points
? minus 4 points
minus 5-7 points
Economic and political integration, creation of supranational bodies (ratification of relevant 
treaties) – 
Signing/ratification of a crucial agreement – 
Top-level visit – 
Visit at the level of ministers, of a parliamentary delegation, negotiations of agreements – 
Positive statements by a head of state, Foreign Ministry, positive parliamentary resolutions, 
positive materials in state or state-controlled media – 
Adverse statements by a head of state, Foreign Ministry, in mass media, adverse parliamentary 
resolutions, adverse materials in state media – 
Protraction of ratification of treaties, non-invitation to international events, failure to provide 
support internationally – 
Infringement of treaties, default on mutual commitments – 
Trade wars, antidumping probes – 
Commodity boycotts, embargoes, recall of diplomats, ambassadors – 
Severance of diplomatic relations, provocations, hostilities – 
January 1 - April 1, 2011
Development of Belarusian-
Chinese relations
Development of Belarus’ relations 
with the Third World
Date     Event                                                                                                            Point
Date     Event                                                                                                            Point
